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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Forest Service’s promulgation of
36 C.F.R. 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), as distinct from the
particular site-specific project to which those
regulations were applied in this case, was a proper
subject of judicial review.
2. Whether respondents established standing to
bring this suit.
3. Whether respondents’ challenge to 36 C.F.R.
215.4(a) and 215.12(f) remained ripe and was
otherwise judicially cognizable after the timber sale
to which the regulations had been applied was
withdrawn, and respondents’ challenges to that sale
had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice,
pursuant to a settlement between the parties.
4. Whether the court of appeals erred in
affirming the nationwide injunction issued by the
district court.
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IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS OF AMICI
CURIAE
Amici law professors teach and write in the areas
of administrative and environmental law and take a
professional interest in the development of this
Court’s justiciability jurisprudence.1
Amici do not take a position on the interpretation
of the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals
Reform Act (ARA), Pub. L. No. 102-381, Tit. III, 106
Stat. 1419 (16 U.S.C. 1612 note). Rather, Amici
respectfully seek to alert the Court to the
unprecedented nature of. Petitioners’ justiciability
claim: contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, this Court
has never held that facial review of agency
regulations is unavailable absent congressional
authorization or imposition of penalties for
regulatory violations. Rather, in facial review cases,
the Court has determined standing by evaluating
past, present, and threatened future injuries to the
plaintiff as a result of the challenged rule, and has
assessed ripeness by considering the fitness of the
issue for judicial review and the hardship to the
parties of delaying review. Under those traditional
tests, Respondents’ facial challenge to 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f) was justiciable when it was
filed and remains justiciable despite the settlement of
Respondents’ site-specific claims.
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Their consent letters are on file with the Clerk of the Court.
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici certify that this brief was not
written in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no
person or entity other than Amici has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
2SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents the question whether a facial
challenge to agency procedural rules can survive the
settlement of a site-specific challenge to an action
taken pursuant to those rules. The Court has ne’ver
squarely addressed that question, but exist:[ng
precedents make the task straightforward and the
answer clear: as long as the plaintiffs establish
standing to file a facial challenge in the first
instance, and wait to file that challenge until si.te-
specific action fleshes out the contours of the partikes’
dispute, the facial challenLge is justiciable at the
outset of the case and remains so even after
settlement of any site-specific disputes.
The circumstances of this case are less
complicated than the parties suggest. As relew~nt
here, Respondents initially filed seven claims for
relief.2 Claims one through six challenged aspects~ of
the Forest Service’s Burnt Ridge Project, a proposed
timber sale in the Sequoia National Forest in
California. Claim seven challenged the validity of 36
C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), regulatory
provisions that purport to exempt many Forest
Service actions, including the Burnt Ridge Project,
from notice, comment, and administrative appeal
procedures required by the ARA. The parties
ultimately settled claims one through six, leaving
only claim seven for the district court to resolve.
Petitioners now assert that claim seven is
2 Other claims in the case are not directly relevant to the
questions presented to this Court. See Resp. Br. at 6.
nonjusticiable, because it is unripe and moot, and
because Respondents lack standing.
The linchpin of Petitioners’ various justiciability
arguments is the assertion that the district court
never had, and never could have had, jurisdiction to
determine the facial validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f). Petitioners insist that from the start
of this case, the district court’s authority was
necessarily limited to deciding the lawfulness of those
provisions as applied to the Burnt Ridge Project. If
that were true, then Petitioners would be correct that
the parties’ settlement of claims one through six
rendered claim seven moot and unripe, and
simultaneously stripped Respondents of standing. As
Petitioners note, the controversy over the Burnt
Ridge Project is over; any claim challenging the
application of procedural provisions to that Project is
no longer justiciable.
But this Court has never held that courts
presumptively lack jurisdiction to review the facial
validity of regulations like 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(f). Indeed, the Court has repeatedly assumed
the reverse, assessing standing and ripeness for such
challenges just as it would for any other claim. Yes,
standing concerns obligate plaintiffs to establish that
a challenged regulation causes them injury in fact--
but Respondents did so here, noting that 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f) regularly prevent them from
submitting comments on or administratively
appealing Forest Service actions, and that those
Forest Service actions in turn threaten Respondents’
use and enjoyment of specific forest areas, including
but not limited to Burnt Ridge. Yes, ripeness
4concerns sometimes obligate plaintiffs to defer filiing
suit until the agency applies the suspect regulation, in
a concrete setting--but Respondents did so here,
waiting to challenge 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(f) until the Forest Service applied those
provisions to the Burnt Ridge Project. Thus, at the
time of filing, Respondents had standing to challenge
the facial validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(f), and their facial challenge was ripe for
review.
The parties’ voluntary settlement of Respondents’
six Burnt Ridge-specific claims does not alter that
analysis. Respondents’ facial challenge to 36 C.F.R.
§§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) is not moot, because the
parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of those
provisions. Respondents continue to have standing,
because Forest Service reliance on the challenged
provisions allegedly continues to erode statutory
procedural protections and thereby to threaten the
health of the many National Forests where
Respondents routinely study and recreate. Fina]lly,
the facial challenge remains ripe, because the
questions raised are legal, the challenged provisions
are final, no further factual development is necessary
to aid judicial review, and Respondents will suffer
hardship if review is delayed.
In short, under the traditional standing and
ripeness tests, Respondents’ challenge to the facial
validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) was
justiciable when filed and remains so today. Even if
this Court disagrees with the foregoing standing and
ripeness analyses, however, nothing about tlhis
routine regulatory challenge necessitates adoption of
Petitioners’ novel rule barring certain types of facial
challenge. If Respondents’ affidavits fail to establish
a real and immediate threat from continued Forest
Service reliance on 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(f), or fail to demonstrate the harm of
postponing review until a later day, this Court has
ample authority within existing standing and
ripeness doctrines to take account of those failings.
There is no need for a new, per se justiciability rule
governing facial challenges, particularly not a rule
that creates a questionable and unnecessary
categorical distinction between claims filed by
regulatory objects and those filed by regulatory
beneficiaries.
ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENTS’ FACIAL CHALLENGE TO
36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) AND 215.12(0 WAS
JUSTICIABLE WHEN FILED
A. Respondents Established Standing To
Bring A Facial Challenge
This Court has never squarely addressed the
issue of standing to challenge the facial validity of
agency rules. On several occasions, however, the
Court has applied traditional standing principles to
assess a plaintiffs standing to seek prospective
review of a governmental practice or rule. See, e.g.,
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)
(suggesting that Lyons would have standing to seek
prospective review of police practice of using
chokeholds if he could demonstrate that he would
"again experience injury as the result of that practice
... if continued"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon (Sweet Home), 515
U.S. 687, 692 (1995) (reaching merits of facial
challenge brought by plaintiffs who alleged that in
certain applications, the challenged rule "injured
them economically").
Five important standing principles relevant to
this case emerge from these and other past cases.
First, plaintiffs like Respondents must satisfy the
familiar constitutional requirement: they must
demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that
is either actual or imminent, and that is both fairly
traceable to the challenged rule and likely to be
redressed by a favorable court decision. E.g., Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007).
Institutional plaintiffs like Respondents may meet
this requirement by submitting affidavits that
identify such an injury to one or more members.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563.
Second, plaintiffs like Respondents, who asl~: a
court to declare an agency rule facially invalid, may
not premise their standing solely on a past injury
resulting from application of the challenged rule. A
past harm does not "amount to that real and
immediate threat of injury necessary to make ou~ a
case or controversy" for injunctive or, equivalently,
facial--relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103. Rather, the
plaintiffs must also demonstrate "continuing, present
adverse effects" of the challenged rule. Id. at 1.02
(asserting that ’"[p]ast exposure to illegal cond~ct
does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief" (quoting O’Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1974))); Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw) (2000) ("[I]n a lawsuit brought
to force compliance, it is the plaintifgs burden to
establish standing by demonstrating that, if
unchecked by the litigation, the defendant’s allegedly
wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and
that the ’threatened injury fis] certainly impending."’
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990))).
Third, plaintiffs who seek to vindicate procedural
rights must identify concrete interests threatened by
the agency’s alleged disregard of those rights. That
is, it is insufficient for the plaintiffs solely to aver
that the agency violated statutory procedural
requirements. The plaintiffs must further establish
that "the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of [the
plaintiffs’] that is the ultimate basis of [their]
standing." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573
n.8.3
3 The Ninth Circuit seemingly disregarded this
requirement in its assessment of Respondents’ standing, instead
asserting that an agency’s violation of a plaintiffs statutory
procedural rights may, without more, form "the basis for injury
in fact for standing purposes." Earth Island Institute v.
Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 693 (2007). That the Ninth Circuit
was too hasty in its standing analysis need not, however, affect
this Court’s consideration of the issue. "[I]t is well settled that
an appellate tribunal may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any
ground supported by the record." Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362,
391 (2002) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215,
(1982) ("Respondent may, of course, defend the judgment below
on any ground which the law and the record permit, provided
the asserted ground would not expand the relief which has been
granted.")). As discussed below, Respondents’ affidavits amply
On the other hand, fourth, plaintiffs seeking
judicial reinstatement of statutory procedural
protections need not ’"meet~ all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.’"
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1453 (quoting
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). That is,
such plaintiffs need not demonstrate that vacating
the challenged, procedurally erosive agency rule
would lead the agency to reconsider the concrete
action or actions on which, the plaintiffs’ standi.ng
rests. Instead, the plaintiffs need only show that the
challenged procedural rule was ’"connected to"’ the
concrete harm. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at
1453 (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of
Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
Finally, fifth, plaintiffs who claim that an agency
violated their procedural rights do not face the same
standing hurdle as other regulatory beneficiary
claimants, whose "asserted injury arises from the
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack
of regulation) of someone else." Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original). Neither
procedural injury nor the concrete harm that may
result from such injury "depends on the unfettered
choices made by independent actors not before the
courts." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Rather, procedural plaintffs challenge an age~cy
action--here a procedural rule--that operates
demonstrate that the procedural rights Respondents seek to
vindicate in this case serve to protect Respondents’ concrete
interest in the lawful management and continued health of the
many, individually identified National Forests that Respondents
regularly use and enjoy.
directly on them, depriving them of procedural
protections to which they are statutorily entitled, and
in the process increasing the likelihood that the
plaintiffs will suffer some identified concrete harm at
the hands of the agency.
In summary, plaintiffs like Respondents, who
question the facial validity of an agency rule that
deprives them of statutory procedural protections,
must establish injury in fact, causation, and
redressability; they must allege not only past harm
but some continuing threat from the challenged rule;
and they must identify a concrete interest that is
threatened by the alleged procedural default.
Lightening this burden somewhat, however, such
plaintiffs need not prove that reinstating the
defaulted procedure would necessarily undo the
identified concrete harm, nor must they clear the
standing hurdle that faces some other regulatory
beneficiary plaintiffs, whose affidavits must "adduce
facts showing that [third parties’] choices have been
or will be made in such manner as to produce
causation and permit redressability of injury," id.
Respondents easily satisfy these requirements.
Their affidavits identify two types of injury: (1)
present injury from a concrete application of 36
C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) specifically, the
injury caused by unlawful salvage logging in the
Burnt Ridge area, undertaken without notice,
comment, or administrative appeal; and (2) real and
immediate threat of injury from ongoing and future
applications of those regulations specifically, the
injury caused by Respondents’ repeated exclusion
from notice, comment, and administrative appeal
10
procedures in connection with Forest Service projects
that threaten the health of the National Forests tl~Lat
Respondents frequent.
Petitioners acknowledge that references to the
former injury in the declarations of Ara Marderosian
adequately demonstrate Respondents’ standing to
challenge the Burnt Ridge Project itself. Pet. Br. at
28; see also J.A. 15-27. But Respondents’ affidavits
do not stop there. They go on to allege that
Respondents’ members regularly camp, canoe, raft,
orienteer, hike, and swim not just in the Burnt Ridge
area but in numerous National Forests nationwide,
Pet. App. 68; that said members visit some fore~,~ts
multiple times per year, Pet. App. 69-70; that the
members study and photograph the plants and
animals in such forests, Pet. App. 68; that the
members believe salvage timber sales in those fore~,~ts
threaten both the forests’ ’%iological health" and the
members’ "recreational interests," Pet. App. 71; t~Lat
the members regularly file successful administrative
appeals of such timber sales, id.; that in 2004, as a
result of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), the
Forest Service categorically excluded twenty timber
sales from administrative appeal in the Allegheny
National Forest alone, Pet. App. 71; and that even
when administrative or judicial appeal remains
available under 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f),
notice procedures are inadequate to permit
Respondents’ members to file appeals in time to save
threatened stands of trees, Pet. App. 76a. See ai!so
Resp. Br. at 29-30, 41-43.
Thus, Respondents’ affidavits not only support
their claim that their members were concretely
11
injured by application of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(f) to the Burnt Ridge timber sale, but also~
more importantly for this case--allege a real and
immediate threat of future identical injuries in
connection with salvage timber sales and other
Forest Service actions in the numerous forests where
Respondents’ members regularly study and recreate.
These past and threatened future injuries are
procedural in form, comprising exclusion from notice,
comment, and administrative appeal procedures. As
Respondents’ affidavits make clear, however, the
procedural injuries connect directly to concrete, on-
the-ground harms--namely, unappealable salvage
logging operations that threaten the health of the
forests that Respondents’ members use and enjoy.
Hence, Respondents’ affidavits satisfy both the
Lyons and the Defenders of Wildlife prerequisites for
standing to bring a facial challenge to a procedural
regulation. Specifically, the affidavits identify a real
and immediate threat of future injury from the
challenged regulations, and they provide details of
the potential concrete consequences of such injury for
both forest health and Respondents’ members’
scientific and recreational interests. At the outset of
the case, therefore Respondents had standing to
challenge not only the application of 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f) to the Burnt Ridge Project, but
also the facial validity of those provisions.
12
B. Respondents’ Facial Challenge W~as
Ripe When Filed
Ripeness poses no greater obstacle to
Respondents’ facial challenge. To begin with, this
Court has never endorsed a categorical ripeness
requirement for regulations of the sort advanced by
Petitioners.    To the contrary, the Court has
consistently read the Administrative Procedure Act
to create a presumption that regulations and other
agency actions are reviewable. See, e.g., Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (allowing faci~al
challenge to regulations by recipients of farm
payments and stating that "judicial review of
administrative    action is the rule,    and
nonreviewability an exception which must be
demonstrated"). The Court should hesitate to change
that presumption, particularly given Congress’s
apparent acquiescence in it, and legislators’ related
understanding that special review statutes are not a
prerequisite for facial review of regulations. See, e.g.,
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951
(2008) (noting importance of stare decisis in statutory
interpretation).
Instead of a per se ripeness rule, the Court has
consistently applied a balancing test, even when
assessing the ripeness of facial challenges to bro~d
agency regulations. While the Court has phrased
this test in different ways at different times, it has
always emphasized that the test is one that requires
a nuanced, multi-factored analysis of the particulars
of each individual case that comes before the courts.
For example, in Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra
Club, the Court evaluated the ripeness of a challenge
13
to a broad forest management plan by proceeding
methodically through a multi-factored analysis
despite the fact that the respondents neither
identified a statutory provision authorizing pre-
enforcement review nor faced immediate economic
consequences from implementation of the challenged
plan. 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). The Ohio Forestry
Court ultimately deemed the challenge in that case
unripe, but the careful analysis in that opinion belies
Petitioners’ assertion that facial claims of the sort
Respondents press are presumptively unreviewable.
Indeed, the Ohio Forestry Court identified at least
two circumstances in which a facial challenge to a
broad forest management plan would be ripe when
filed: (1) if the plaintiff alleged violations of the
procedural National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 et seq.; or (2) if the forest
plan allowed activity that would inevitably result in
harm to the environment. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at
737 and 738-39 (noting, respectively, that a
procedural claim "can never get riper," and that the
government conceded that a forest plan that
"allow[ed] motorcycles into a bird-watching area or
something like that, ... would be immediately
justiciable").4 The lesson of Ohio Forestry, therefore,
4 Lower courts have consistently followed Ohio Forestry
in allowing review of National Forest plans in these
circumstances. See, e.g., Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463
F.3d 1163, 1173-75 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding NEPA challenge to
revisions to National Forest plans ripe, and citing Ohio
Forestry); Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Management,
284 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (same for Bureau of
Land Management plan); Montana Snowmobile Ass’n v. Wildes,
103 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1243-44 (D. Mont. 2000) (finding
14
is that facial challenges to broad agency regulations
may well be reviewable provided they satisfy the
traditional, multi-factored ripeness test.5
The next step in this case, then, is to apply that
multi-factored test to Respondents’ facial claim. ]In
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (Abbott Labs), the
Court explained the test as follows:
[The] basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial
challenge to decision to close National Forest areas to
snowmobile use ripe as of date of plan adoption).
5 Amici American Forest Paper Association, et al.
(AFPA) characterize National Wildlife Federation and Ohio
Forestry as limiting the available remedy in broad challenges to
"the extent of the ripe as-applied controversy; a remedy that is
not systemic, but is less far-reaching." AFPA Amicus Br. at 1.4-
16 (internal quotations omitted). But National Wildlife
Federation involved a challenge to a land withdrawal review
program that did not comprise "a single [Bureau of La:ad
Management] order or regulation, or even ... a completed
universe of ... orders and regulations," and thus did not qualify
as a reviewable agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 497 U.S. at 890. Likewise, the Ohio Fores~’,ry
plaintiffs challenged a broad forest management plan before the
Forest Service had applied the plan in a concrete setting,
leading the Court to conclude both that judicial review "could
hinder agency efforts to refine its policies," and that the Court
itself might benefit from further factual development. 523 U.S.
at 735, 737. Neither circumstance is present here: Respondents
challenge duly promulgated regulations, not a nebulous age~Lcy
"program," and they waited to file their challenge until the
agency finalized those regulations and applied them in a
concrete and concretely harmful manner.
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interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties. The
problem is best seen in a twofold aspect,
requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.
387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).~
Given this description, it is abundantly clear that
Respondents’ facial challenge to 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(i) was ripe when filed. This is not an
"abstract disagreement~ over administrative
policies," nor would judicial review interfere with an
agency decision before it "has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." 387 U.S. at 148-49. Petitioners have not
only finalized and published 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f), they have also applied those provisions
in numerous concrete circumstances that harmed
Respondents--most obviously in connection with the
Burnt Ridge salvage timber sale. Respondents
concededly seek relief that extends beyond that sale,
but Petitioners’ application of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f) in the context of the sale prevents this
6 The Ohio Forestry Court provided an alternative
exposition of this test but acknowledged that the two tests are
the same in spirit. 523 U.S. at 733 (ripeness analysis requires
courts to consider "(1) whether delayed review would cause
hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention
would inappropriately interfere with further administrative
action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further
factual development of the issues presented").
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from being an abstract disagreement, and serves as
proof that the agency has already "formalized" the
policy embodied in those provisions. Thus, informal
consideration of the circumstances of this case
suggests that the ’%asic rationale" for the ripeness
inquiry is inapplicable here.
Evaluation of the fitness of the issues for judicial
review and the hardship to Respondents of
postponing review bears out this informal conclusion.
This Court has identified three factors relevant to the
fitness analysis: (1) whether the case raises purely
legal issues that a court can assess in the absence of
a concrete factual circumstance, e.g., Nat’l Park
Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
812 (2003); (2) whether the challenged agency action
is "final," e.g., Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 149; and (3)
whether "some concrete action applying the
regulation" in a way that harms the plaintiff h~as
"reduced ... the scope of the controversy ... to ...
manageable proportions, and ... fleshed out ... its
factual components," Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.So 871, 891 (1990). In this case, all
three factors weigh in favor of immediate review.
First, the issues in the case are purely legal.
Respondents’ sole claim is that 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f), which purport to exempt certain Fore, st
Service actions from notice, comment, and
administrative appeal, contravene the ARA, which
requires the Forest Service to establish notice,
comment, and administrative appeal processes fbr
those same actions. Thus, Respondents ask this
Court to answer precisely ~he same legal question
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posed in Abbott Labs: "whether the statute was
properly construed by" Petitioners. 387 U.S. at 149.
Abbott Labs is also instructive on the issue of
finality. Like Petitioners in that case, Respondents
here challenge a rule "promulgated in a formal
manner after announcement in the Federal Register
and consideration of comments by interested
parties .... " Id. at 151. There is nothing to suggest
that 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f~ are anything
but "definitive. There is no hint that [these]
regulation[s are] informal, or only the ruling of a
subordinate official, or tentative." Abbott Labs, 387
U.S. at 151 (internal citations omitted). On the
contrary, 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) "mark
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
process ...." Bennett vo Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178
(1997).
Third, Respondents’ simultaneous filing of
challenges to the Burnt Ridge salvage timber sale
and to the facial validity of the procedural
regulations governing that sale (that is, 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f)) alleviates any concern that
this Court ought to delay review of the latter
challenge until "the scope of the controversy has been
reduced to more manageable proportions, and its
factual components fleshed out, by some concrete
action ... that harms or threatens to harm"
Respondents. Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at
891. The Burnt Ridge controversy has already
"reduced ... the scope of the controversy" over 36
C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) to "manageable
proportions," and "fleshed out ... its factual
components." Id. This Court can have no question
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about the likely application of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f)--the Burnt Ridge project illustrates not
just when but precisely how the Forest Service
intends to apply those provisions.7
Moving to the second prong of the formal
ripeness analysis, it is also clear that delaying review
of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) would harm
Respondents. As discussed above, Respondents keep
careful track of proposed Forest Service projects like
"timber sales, [off-road vehicle (ORV)] trail[s,
prescribed burns, [and] wildlife openings," J.A. 813,
and they regularly submit comments on and file
administrative appeals of such projects. See supra at
10. Respondents undertake these time- and resourc, e-
intensive efforts because they agree with the policy
embodied in the ARA’s notice, comment, and
administrative appeal provisions: responsible forest
management depends on the active involvement of all
interested stakeholders--not only the companies that
stand to profit from timber sales, but also the hikers,
boaters, birdwatchers, photographers, ORV users,
and naturalists who frequent and enjoy our national
7 This observation serves to distinguish Responde~,ts’
facial challenge to 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) from
several other claims that remained in the case after the parties
settled the Burnt Ridge controversy, but which the Nir[th
Circuit subsequently dismissed as unripe: because Respondents
had not established that the regulations challenged in those
claims "were applied in the context of the Burnt Ridge Project,"
the record was insufficiently "concrete to permit th[e] court to
review the application of the regulation[s] ... and to determine"
whether Petitioners planned to use the regulations in a manner
"consistent with the ARA." Pet. App. 14a-15a. The same cannot
be said of the record concerning application of 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f).
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forests and seek to ensure that Forest Service
management policies effectively "protect[ forest]
ecosystems, watersheds, and the environmental and
social value of these areas" to meet both "present ...
needs and the needs of future generations." J.A. 16.
The challenged procedural provisions make the
involvement of stakeholders like Respondents more
difficult in some instances, impossible in others. The
Forest Service frequently undertakes projects
governed by 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f),
including timber sales, prescribed burns, and ORV
trail development, in the many national forests that
Respondents’ members regularly visit. J.A. 85-88.
Thus, it is concededly probable that Respondents will
eventually have another opportunity to challenge 36
C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) in the context of
some future project. In the meantime, though, the
absence of ARA-required notice and the preclusion of
administrative appeal will not only force
Respondents to go to great lengths to obtain their
statutorily mandated access to Forest Service
decisionmaking, Pet. App. 76a, but also prevent
them from obtaining review of some projects in time
to stop trees from being cut, J.A. 85-88.    This
combination of procedural harm to Respondents and
consequent concrete damage to the forests they
regularly visit easily satisfies the "hardship to the
parties" prong of the ripeness analysis. See, e.g.,
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738-39 (discussing
government concession that an agency rule resulting
in immediate environmental harm is ripe for review).
Moreover, it is worth noting, as Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation observes, that the two
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prongs of the ripeness inquiry "are tools designed to
allow the Court accurately to assess whether [to] stay
the judicial hand," rather than "sine qua non"
requirements, to be applied "mechanistically."
Pacific Legal Foundation Amicus Br. at 11-12.
Consistent with this observation, the Court regularly
evaluates both ripeness factors, even if one comes up
short. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at
891 (suggesting that regardless of the "fitness of tlhe
issues," facial review is available to plaintiffs w]ho
would be required to adjust their condu~ct
immediately in the absence of such review); Ohio
Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 733 (assessing the Abbott
Labs factors "taken together"); Nat’l Park Hospitality
Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 812 (considering whether the issue
in the case was fit for review even after concludi~3g
that delayed review would work no real hardship on
the parties). In practice, this fact suggests that a
court need not stay its hand in a case like this, in
which the issues are eminently fit for review, even if
the court deems the plaintiffs hardship showing less
than compelling.
In conclusion, contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion,
Respondents’ facial challenge to 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f) is not the sort of pre-enforcement cla![m
that ordinarily troubles this Court. Indeed, it is no~; a
pre-enforcement claim at all. True, Respondents filed
a facial challenge to broad procedural regulatio~s,
but they waited to do so until the agency had applied
those regulations in the concrete setting of the Burnt
Ridge timber sale. In the aftermath of that sale,
there can be no question about the Forest Service’s
intent to apply 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(i) to
salvage timber sales and other actions that implicate
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forest health, nor can there be any doubt about the
harmful effects of those regulations when so applied.
Thus, there is no reason for this Court to stay its
hand.
II. DESPITE SETTLEMENT OF THE BURNT
RIDGE CONTROVERSY, THE DISTRICT
COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION TO
HEAR       RESPONDENTS’       FACIAL
CHALLENGE TO 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) AND
215.12(0
Given that Respondents had standing to
challenge the facial validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f) at the outset of this case, and their
claim was then ripe, the only remaining justiciability
question is whether the parties’ voluntary settlement
of the Burnt Ridge controversy somehow mooted
Respondents’ facial challenge, or stripped
Respondents of standing, or rendered the facial
challenge unripe. The short answer to this question
is no.
A. Resolution Of A Site-Specific Dispute
Does Not Moot A Facial Challenge
To begin with, settlement of a site-specific
controversy need not and should not moot a
contemporaneous facial challenge to the legal validity
of a broad agency rule, even if the agency happened
to apply the latter rule in the former context. Cf.
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393-
94 (1981) (noting well-settled exception to the
mootness doctrine when "one issue in a case has
become moot, but the case as a whole remains alive
because other issues have not become moot").
Indeed, the suggestion is somewhat absurd.
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To see this absurdity, consider the faci.al
challenge that this Court entertained in Sweet Home.
In that case, the respondents challenged the faci.al
validity of a Department of Interior rule that defined
the term "harm" in the Endangered Species Act, 515
U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("This case, of
course, comes to us as a facial challenge."), basing
their standing on allegations that "application of tlhe
’harm’ regulation" to certain species "had injured
them economically," id. at 692 (Stevens, J.). Putting
the standing question to one side for a moment, it
would be absurd to suggest that the Department of
Interior could have mooted the respondents’ faciial
claim by reaching voluntary side "deals" with tlhe
respondents one species at a time. An agency’s
voluntary agreement not to apply a challenged
regulation in a particular circumstance does rLot
answer the related but distinct--and considerably
broader--question of the legality of all comparable
applications.
The Laidlaw Court recognized this very
distinction when it noted that a defendant’s
voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct may not
moot a suit for injunctive relief provided the conduct
was ongoing when the suit was filed (that is, provided
there is no question of the plaintiffs standing at the
outset of the case). The Court elaborated:
Thus, in Lyons, ... we held that a plaintiff
lacked initial standing to seek an injunction
against the enforcement of a police chokehold
policy because he could not credibly allege that
he faced a realistic threat arising from the
policy. Elsewhere in the opinion, however, we
noted that a citywide moratorium on police
chokeholds ... would not have mooted an
otherwise valid claim for injunctive relief,
because the moratorium by its terms was not
permanent. The plain lesson of [this case] is
that there are circumstances in which the
prospect that a defendant will engage in (or
resume) harmful conduct may be too
speculative to support standing, but not too
speculative to overcome mootness.
528 U.S. at 190 (internal citations omitted).
Consistent with this lesson, Petitioners do not in
fact claim that their settlement of the Burnt Ridge
controversy moots any suggestion that 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(f) may continue to be harmful to
Respondents. Instead, Petitioners premise their
mootness argument on their central assertion that
the district court only ever had jurisdiction to assess
the legality of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) as
applied to the Burnt Ridge timber sale. If that
assertion were true, then settlement of the timber
sale controversy would indeed have mooted
Respondents’ procedural challenge. Once the parties
resolved the controversy over the sale, the lawfulness
of the agency’s procedure in approving the sale no
longer had moment.
As discussed above, however, when this case was
filed, Respondents had standing to challenge the
facial validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f),
and their challenge was ripe. Settlement of the
Burnt Ridge controversy did nothing to resolve or
otherwise moot that challenge. Viewed in this light,
Petitioners’ mootness argument seems a cynical
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effort to leverage their voluntary settlement of t:he
Burnt Ridge controversy into a settlement of t:he
parties’ entire dispute a settlement to which
Respondents did not agree. Cf. Laidlaw 528 U.S. at
189 ("It is well settled that ’a defendant’s voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a
federal court of its power to determine the legality of
the practice .... [I]f it did, the courts would be
compelled to leave the defendant ... free to return to
his old ways."’ (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, n.10 (1982) (internal
quotation and citation omitted))).
Petitioners’ suggestion that this case is moot fails
for another reason, too: the tenor of the mootness
doctrine favors Respondents here. As then-Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote in Honig v. Doe, "while an
unwillingness to decide moot cases may be connected
to the case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is
an attenuated connection that may be overridden
where there are strong reasons to override it." 484
U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). If
there were any mootness concerns to override here
(which there are not, as noted above), reasons exist to
do so: it is alleged that the Forest Service adopted a
rule grossly inconsistent with its governing statute;
the parties extensively litigated that purely legal
question below; the question was suited for judicial
resolution; the lower courts resolved the question in
Respondents’ favor; and Petitioners chose not to
pursue their merits arguments in this Court. "[~]o
abandon the case at [this] advanced stage [would]
prove more wasteful than frugal." Laidlaw, 528 U.S.
at 191-92.
B. Respondents Continue To Have
Standing To Challenge The Facial
Validity Of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) And
215.12(0, And Their Facial Challenge
Remains Ripe
Petitioners’ standing and ripeness arguments are
equally unavailing. Settlement of the Burnt Ridge
controversy did indeed strip Respondents of standing
to challenge the procedures used in approving the
Burnt Ridge timber sale, and that settlement
simultaneously rendered such a challenge unripe.
But throughout this case, the Burnt Ridge sale has
played a less central role in Respondents’ facial
challenge to 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(i) than
Petitioners would have this Court believe.
It is worth exploring, briefly, the contours of that
role. With respect to standing, the circumstances of
the Burnt Ridge sale serve to illustrate the precise
nature of the injury that Respondents suffer
whenever and wherever the Forest Service relies on
36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) in approving a
timber sale or taking similar action. That is, the
Burnt Ridge controversy supplies part of the answer
to any claim that Respondents’ injury from Forest
Service reliance on 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and
215.12(i) is hypothetical rather than actual, abstract
rather than concrete. Specifically, if the Forest
Service continues to rely on those provisions in
approving timber sales, developing ORV trails, or
carrying out prescribed burns in the forests that
Respondents regularly visit, then Respondents will
be injured actually and concretely, just as they were
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in connection with the Burnt Ridge sale. See supra
at 10; Pet. Br. at 28; J.A. 15-27.
The sale serves a similar role with respect to
ripeness. In the ripeness context, the fact of the sale
answers any prudential concern that the courts ought
to wait to review 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f)
until the Forest Service takes "some concrete actic,n"
that harms respondents and renders the controversy
less abstract, Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at
891. The answer is simple--the Service has already
taken such an action, by approving the Burnt Ridge
sale without following the notice, comment, and
administrative appeal procedures called for by the
ARA. See supra at 17-18.
If Respondents had sought review of the facial
validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) before
the Forest Service applied those provisions in a
concrete context, some uncertainty would have
remained as to how and in what circumstances the
provisions would operate to strip Respondents of
statutory procedural protections, and with what
concrete result. The courts might well have found
that uncertainty fatal to Respondents’ claim, under
the rubric of standing, or ripeness, or both.
But that is not this case. Whether through
foresight or fortuity, Respondents waited to file their
facial challenge together with their challenge to ~;he
Burnt Ridge timber sale. The sale then served both
as Respondents’ illustration of the sort of procedural
and concrete harms they have suffered and will
continue to suffer due to application of 36 C.F.R. §§
215.4(a) and 215.12(i) (standing), and as their
response to any prudential concerns about the timiLng
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of facial review (ripeness). That the controversy over
the sale has since been resolved changes nothing
about this analysis; the circumstances of the sale still
readily serve both functions.
III. NOTHING ABOUT THIS CASE
NECESSITATES ADOPTION OF A NOVEL
JUSTICIABILITY RULE FOR FACIAL
CHALLENGES
Finally, even if this Court disagrees with the
foregoing mootness, standing, and ripeness analyses,
nothing about this routine challenge to agency
environmental rulemaking necessitates adoption of a
novel categorical ban on certain facial challenges. On
the contrary, the traditional standing inquiry and
multi-factored test for ripeness provide this Court
ample authority to evaluate the sufficiency of
Respondents’ affidavits. See supra at 9-11, 18-20.
Moreover, those tests have a distinct advantage over
any more categorical rule: they preserve judicial
authority to hear facial challenges in this or future
cases if the Court is convinced that delayed review
would work a serious hardship on the parties.
Petitioners’ suggested categorical rule, by
contrast, contravenes this Court’s precedent and
enshrines an unfair and unnecessary categorical
distinction between regulatory objects facing
penalties and all other parties affected by agency
action.S Petitioners argue that the only situation in
s Amici AFPA make the most explicit argument for such
a distinction, claiming that "[m]o~t ... facial challenges to rules
are not justiciable when brought by third parties who are not
immediately burdened by the rules, but are justiciable when
brought by the regulated industry." AFPA Amicus Br. at 21.
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which an agency rule is reviewable absent statutory
authorization or site-specific implementation is when
the plaintiff faces "the prospect of serious penalti.es
for an unsuccessful challenge." Pet. Br. at 20-21.
But this Court has never suggested that the
plaintiffs status as a regulatory object facing
penalties is a touchstone for ripeness. Instead, the
Court has consistently evaluated the practical
impacts of the agency’s rule on all parties, whatever
their relationship to the agency, and whether or not
penalties are threatened. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic
Social Services, 509 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (explaining
that ripeness depends on whether the "effects of the
administrative action challenged have been ’felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties" (quoting
Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 148-49); Ohio Forestry, 523
U.S. at 733-34 (holding agency plan unripe because it
neither "inflicts significant practical harm upon the
interests that [plaintiff] advances" nor "force[s
plaintiff] to modify its behavior ... to avoid future
adverse consequences"); Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n,
538 U.S. at 810 (finding regulation unripe for review
because it causes plaintiff "no practical harm"); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 894 (noting that the Court
"intervene[s] in the administration of the laws only
when ... a specific ’final agency action’ has an actual
or immediately threatened effect").
Of course, one example of an agency action that is
usually--but not alwaysg--ripe for facial, pre-
~ See Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. at 57 (citing
Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) for the
proposition that not "every case" involving regulations that
constrain industry behavior is ripe for review, depending on the
severity of the impacts on the industry).
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enforcement review is a regulation that imposes
serious penalties for noncompliance. See, e.g., Abbott
Labs, 387 U.S. 136. But that is hardly the only
example. The Court has also allowed parties to
challenge agency regulations involving the possibility
of licenses or other future benefits from the
government. See, e.g., United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (allowing
review of FCC order that would have denied future
licenses to plaintiff); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (finding ripe challenge
to state law regarding permitting requirements for
nuclear power plants, even though no utilities had
yet applied for permits). So too, the Court has made
clear that a facial challenge brought by regulatory
beneficiaries may be ripe in some circumstances. See
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (stating that a claim of
procedural error with respect to an agency action of
general applicability may be ripe whatever the status
of the plaintiff); id. at 738-39 (observing that
immediate environmental harm might justify facial
review of an agency action of general applicability,
again regardless of the plaintiffs status). In short,
the per se distinction that Petitioners attempt to
draw between regulated entities subject to penalties
and everyone else affected by administrative actions
finds no support in this Court’s ripeness caselaw.
Petitioners’ proposed distinction is also unsound
as a policy matter. There is absolutely no reason to
believe that regulated industry is so politically and
administratively vulnerable that it should receive
special access to the courts. Indeed, public choice
theory suggests the opposite--relative to public
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interest organizations, industry may well be better
able to promote its interests in the legislature and
the executive branch. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 2![8-
220 (1992) (noting that regulated industry may have
greater lobbying access and ability); Eric Biber, The
Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative
Law, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 40-41 (2008) (same).
Accordingly, it would be perverse for this Court to
adopt a justiciability rule that distorts existing
administrative law doctrines to provide special
solicitude for regulated industries facing penalties.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should not
accept the government’s cramped view of courts’
authority to assess the facial validity of agency
regulations. The district court had ample authority
to review the facial validity of 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a)
and 215.12(f) at all relevant times in this case: wl~Len
the case was filed, when the parties settled the Burnt
Ridge dispute, and when that court issued its
judgment. Moreover, whatever one’s view of the
justiciability of Respondents’ facial claim, this Co~rt
need not and should not adopt Petitioners’ categorical
distinction between regulatory objects facing
penalties and all others affected by agency acti~n.
Such a distinction would not only contravene tlhis
Court’s ripeness jurisprudence but unnecessarily
restrict the Court’s authority to hear this and other
cases in which regulatory action threatens immedi,ate
harm to the parties.
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